Good News From Iraq
Source: The Washington Times
al Qaeda tried to get forced marriages with local Iraqi Sunni women as a way to get a better foothold in Iraq. Fortunately the move has helped turn the Sunnis against al Qaeda.
Australian Col. David Kilcullen, who just completed a tour as senior counterinsurgency aide to U.S. commander Gen. David H. Petraeus in Baghdad, said in an extensive analysis that the decision by the Sunni tribes to break with al Qaeda could prove a major — if unanticipated — boost to President Bush's surge strategy in the country.
"The uprising represents very significant political progress toward reconciliation at the grass-roots level, and major security progress in marginalizing extremists and reducing civilian deaths," Col. Kilcullen wrote Wednesday in the military blog Small Wars Journal (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
With an estimated 30,000 Sunni fighters in Iraq now battling their former al Qaeda allies, "the tribal revolt is arguably the most significant change in the Iraqi operating environment for several years," he added in his entry titled "Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt." ...
The tactic of forced political marriages was standard for al Qaeda, according to Col. Kilcullen, used successfully in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia and elsewhere to "embed" the international terrorist network in the local kinship and tribal network.
"The uprising represents very significant political progress toward reconciliation at the grass-roots level, and major security progress in marginalizing extremists and reducing civilian deaths," Col. Kilcullen wrote Wednesday in the military blog Small Wars Journal (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
With an estimated 30,000 Sunni fighters in Iraq now battling their former al Qaeda allies, "the tribal revolt is arguably the most significant change in the Iraqi operating environment for several years," he added in his entry titled "Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt." ...
The tactic of forced political marriages was standard for al Qaeda, according to Col. Kilcullen, used successfully in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia and elsewhere to "embed" the international terrorist network in the local kinship and tribal network.
To understand how the al Qaeda forced marriage foothold works it's necessary to read Col. Kilcullen's article on his blog "Anatomy of a Tribal Rebellion," and understand how the tribes and clans society works. With that understanding you can see the incentive for al Qaeda to exploit the inherent social customs and tribal network to widen their military dominance.
The fundamental aspect of tribal identity is extended kinship [9]. The tribe is the largest unit whose associated clan claims a common lineage or descent. But the tribe is more than just a number of descent–based groups, for an individual’s stated membership in a particular genealogical heritage can be partly a political act. Much of tribal genealogy, if it exists at all, is often based on fictive kinship ties. In claiming a particular ancestry, individuals may align themselves with a given political position and strategy which cannot be simply glossed over as kinship. Tribes exist in a perpetual state of flux. Associations and alliances shift and individuals may move across permeable boundaries. In this sense, tribal identity is flexible since it incorporates an invented quality that provides a context for political and social action.
The clan is the second level of organization in Iraq and derives its unity of purpose from its Sheikh, his family lineage, and the territorial proximity of the various sub–clan affiliates of which it is composed. Sub–clans are a composite of patrilineal groups and extended families. These in turn are composed of kinship groups and divided into households. The tribe and clan performs a political and military function, sub–clans and households an economic one. Leadership is traditionally reserved to the outstanding patrilineal lineage of the strongest sub–clan, with the strongest clan providing the leadership of the tribe. In the case of a pan–tribal confederation, the strongest tribe holds the Sheikh of Sheikh position. In a Hobbesian world of perpetual conflict, weaker tribes will seek security through alliances with larger, stronger ones.
In attempting to explain the situation in Iraq, the idea that "4th Generation Warfare" represents an evolved form of insurgency must consider the fact that tribal society already has at its disposal affiliated social, economic, and military networks easily adapted to war–fighting. The ways in which the insurgents are exploiting the tribal network does not represent an evolved form of insurgency but the expression of inherent cultural and social customs.
...A group of extended families gains control over a sub–clan. The sub–clan exploits existing social, economic, and military networks and widens its dominance through the negotiation of alliances and patronage with other key clans and tribes to win a preeminent position in a new or pre–existing tribal confederation. Once the tribal confederation has amassed enough influence it challenges the state to gain power.
The clan is the second level of organization in Iraq and derives its unity of purpose from its Sheikh, his family lineage, and the territorial proximity of the various sub–clan affiliates of which it is composed. Sub–clans are a composite of patrilineal groups and extended families. These in turn are composed of kinship groups and divided into households. The tribe and clan performs a political and military function, sub–clans and households an economic one. Leadership is traditionally reserved to the outstanding patrilineal lineage of the strongest sub–clan, with the strongest clan providing the leadership of the tribe. In the case of a pan–tribal confederation, the strongest tribe holds the Sheikh of Sheikh position. In a Hobbesian world of perpetual conflict, weaker tribes will seek security through alliances with larger, stronger ones.
In attempting to explain the situation in Iraq, the idea that "4th Generation Warfare" represents an evolved form of insurgency must consider the fact that tribal society already has at its disposal affiliated social, economic, and military networks easily adapted to war–fighting. The ways in which the insurgents are exploiting the tribal network does not represent an evolved form of insurgency but the expression of inherent cultural and social customs.
...A group of extended families gains control over a sub–clan. The sub–clan exploits existing social, economic, and military networks and widens its dominance through the negotiation of alliances and patronage with other key clans and tribes to win a preeminent position in a new or pre–existing tribal confederation. Once the tribal confederation has amassed enough influence it challenges the state to gain power.
With the loss of potentially tens of thousands of local insurgents, plus the losses they are taking through the surge, al Qaeda looses the economic, social, and military network necessary to convince to convince us that our goals are either unattainable or too costly.
It seem though, that the Iraq insurgency has already convinced the left in this country, because the left is constantly telling us that that our goals are unattainable and too costly. I wouldn't go so far as to say that al Qaeda is in it's last throws, but with their surge losses, and the Sunnis against them, their effectiveness is greatly reduced.